"Tillich's chief claim to fame will be that he fooled a lot of people... Tillich is a complete atheist who lost his belief while completing his higher education. Intellectually he despises Christianity ... Still, being the son of a clergyman and having a fondness for religious life, Tillich [will] have his cake and eat it too. He is going to remain with the Church for the purpose of undermining Christianity from within." --- Leonard F. Wheat
As I noted in my previous
post, militant atheists like Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris have adopted an interesting "divide and conquer" strategy towards religion. As they see it, there are only two types of religious people: i) "true believers" (i.e., fundamentalists), and ii) "closet-atheists" who are simply lying to themselves. The brilliance of this strategy is that it allows them to dismiss "moderate" and reasonable" believers as insincere cowards, while applying the "religious" label only to easily-dismissed extremists and fanatics. Moreover, their scheme slams the door on any attempt to reconcile science and religion, since the slightest accommodation on the part of religion is viewed as an attempt to salvage what is already lost. Of course, Dennett and Harris have never been interested in accommodation or peaceful coexistence; they want to see religion annihilated. By suggesting that there are only two viable philosophical positions for intellectually honest people - primitive theism or scientific materialism - they hope to increase the chances that people will pick the latter.
As the quote at the top of this post shows, such atheists frequently take aim at Paul Tillich, who represents, for them, the epitome of the "atheist theologian." They've referred to Tillich's theology as "semantic hocus-pocus", "strictly bogus", a "bold masquerade", and "nonsensical hokum and claptrap". But do the charges stick? Was Paul Tillich really an atheist? The following quotes of his would seem to say yes:
"God does not exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and existence. Therefore to argue that God exists is to deny him."
"God is the symbol for God"
"The God of theism is dead"
While these statements are provocative (perhaps deliberately so), a closer look at Tillich's position makes him appear less controversial. Let's start with his oft-repeated assertion that "God is not a being, but being-itself." For Tillich, "being-itself" (or "the power of being") is the only possible definition of God because all other options turn God into a "Supreme Being" that is something less than God. "If God is not being-itself, he is, in fact, in as much bondage as the old Greek gods were in bondage to fate - a King indeed but only a puppet-king." (taken from Tillich by J. Heywood Thomas). Thus, his motivation for defining God as "being-itself" is to protect the transcendence of God from idolatrous misconceptions, not to cover his atheism with silly word tricks.
Much the same goes for his talk of "symbols". Tillich's remark that "God is the symbol for God" lead many to conclude that he regarded God as merely symbolic (i.e., not real). However, Tillich was simply conveying the fact that human language can never fully grasp the ineffable glory of God, since our "superlatives become diminutives" when applied to God. However, Tillich argued that language is capable of pointing to the reality God in a symbolic fashion, although it is never identical with that reality. Thus, symbols are truly glorious things, because they allow us to describe the indescribable, opening up levels of reality that are closed to literal language. With this in mind, his talk of "the God above the God of theism" makes more sense. The "God of theism" is the symbolically-conceived God that is forever transcended by the True God. Far from being a nonsensical phrase designed to trick people into believing, this is Tillich's way of affirming both the validity of theological speech and the complete otherness of God.
Thus, while the form of Tillich's doctrine of God is certainly unconventional, I think its substance lies comfortably within the Christian tradition. So why all the confusion? Here, Tillich certainly deserves much of the blame, as his critics (both Christians and atheists) are correct in saying that he often obscures more than he reveals. In particular, I find his concept of "ultimate concern" to be poorly-defined and prone to misinterpretation. When used as a synonym for "faith", the term is unproblematic. But Tillich sometimes suggests that "ultimate concern" is God, leading many to think that he advocates a purely immanent God. Less abstraction and more clarity on this matter would have been helpful.
In my opinion, the proper question to ask regarding Tillich's theology is not "Is it atheistic?" but "Is it useful?". On this point, I'm not fully convinced, since it appears that by trying to bridge the gap between theology and philosophy, and between theism and atheism, he has not satisfied either side. Atheists are not convinced that he has done more than just play with words, and Christians are not likely to start praying to an impersonal "ground of being." Of course, it's valuable that someone of Tillich's ability has made the effort, and he leaves a tremendous legacy to build upon. But for the moment, I can't call myself a follower.